An ethical assessment of low carbon vehicles using cost benefit analysis by Thomopoulos, N & Harrison, G
This is an author produced version of An ethical assessment of low carbon vehicles using 
cost benefit analysis.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/121428/
Article:
Thomopoulos, N and Harrison, G orcid.org/0000-0002-4324-772X (2016) An ethical 
assessment of low carbon vehicles using cost benefit analysis. International Journal of 
Automotive Technology and Management, 16 (3). p. 227. ISSN 1470-9511 
https://doi.org/10.1504/IJATM.2016.080788
© 2016 Inderscience Enterprises Ltd. This is an author produced version of a paper 
published in International Journal of Automotive Technology and Management. Uploaded 
in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy.
promoting access to
White Rose research papers
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
1 
 
An ethical assessment of low carbon vehicles using Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
Abstract 
Global concerns about climate change, as confirmed at COP21, have led to lower 
carbon emissions environmental policies, particularly in the road transport sector. Through an 
empirical analysis of Low Carbon Vehicle (LCV) policies in California, this paper contrasts 
the findings from diverse distribution theories between income quintiles - used as a proxy for 
social groups - to address vertical equity concerns and offer an overview of impact 
distribution to policy makers. Thus, it contributes in operationalising ethical theories within 
transport Cost-Benefit Analysis and revisiting impact distribution when promoting low 
carbon vehicles. Findings indicate that manufacturer penalties are the most effective policy 
measure to avoid cost transfer between stakeholders. Yet, the analysis shows that those 
purchasing small LCVs may face disproportional vehicle purchase cost increases which needs 
to be considered by policy makers. Thus, this paper makes a methodological contribution 
regarding CBA in practice as well as providing policy relevant recommendations. 
Keywords: low carbon vehicles, LCVs, Cost Benefit Analysis, CBA, ethics, assessment 
 
1. Introduction 
The use of Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) has been dominating transport policy appraisal 
for several decades in developed countries, particularly in Europe (Odgaard et al, 2005; 
Mackie and Worsley, 2013). Despite the on-going diffusion of ICT to improve data accuracy 
in a lot of sectors including transport (Thomopoulos et al, 2015), this prevailing position 
appears not to have been significantly challenged yet due to the virtues of CBA (Mackie, 
2011), though it has been subject to an increasing debate in the realm of other sectors such as 
healthcare. Nevertheless, certain criticisms of CBA practice remain unresolved as highlighted 
in the literature (Beukers et al, 2012; ITF, 2011; Mouter et al, 2013b; Mouter et al, 2015; 
Thomopoulos et al, 2009; van Wee, 2011).  
One of the major criticisms of CBA revolves around impact quantification and 
monetization (Mackie and Preston, 1998), whereas another key one is about the assessment of 
impact distribution. Wider economic impacts, equity and other non-monetised impacts are not 
included formally in the appraisal and are not considered explicitly by decision makers since 
they form part of separate tables which are not incorporated in the Benefit Cost Ratio (BCR) 
(Mackie and Worsley, 2013). These are not excluded per se from conventional CBA (van 
Wee, 2012), yet impact distribution often does not form a key part of the analysis. The latter 
issue is intertwined with equity and ethical issues which are implicitly addressed when 
implementing a utilitarian based approach. It is acknowledged here that not all transport 
policies include equity as one of their explicit objectives, although issues such as climate 
change or environmental pollution are directly relevant since the whole of the population in a 
given geographical area is affected. Hence, equity concerns and ethics are intertwined with 
impact distribution due to their implicit inclusion in the welfare maximisation objective of 
CBA, which forms an identified weakness of this appraisal method in practice. 
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As already pointed out, both the contents and process of CBA should be improved to 
aid transport appraisal overall (Beukers et al, 2012; van Wee, 2012), potentially focusing 
more on the actual role of this widely used method which could be more subtle (Mouter et al, 
2013a). Alternative approaches and theories may be used within a wider appraisal framework 
having CBA at its core (Annema et al, 2015; Thomopoulos, 2010). Such an approach would 
utilize the strengths of CBA while addressing some of its weaknesses. This would also satisfy 
the requirement set out by Roeser (2012) according to which policy makers “should not be 
unemotional calculators […] but through a cultivation of their moral emotions and sensitivity 
engage in more responsible decision making,  since “we need emotions to make a rational 
decision” (Roeser, 2006). Along the same lines, this paper demonstrates that alternative 
approaches can and should be tested in practice to enhance the assessment of impact 
distribution among diverse socio-economic groups. This objective can be met through case 
studies, so the aim of this paper is accomplished through an application of a System 
Dynamics model (Walther et al. 2010; Harrison and Shepherd 2014) providing the input to 
improve the contents and prospects of CBA (Turner, 2007). 
Previous research has focused on aggregate policy impacts of biofuels, electric vehicles 
or other emission reduction schemes (Ghermandy et al, 2013; Marsden and Hess, 2011; Oxley 
et al, 2012; Podhora et al, 2013; Rode et al, 2014), but not on impact distribution among 
social groups. Therefore, this paper contrasts findings between income quintiles used as a 
proxy for social groups to extend previous findings and offer an overview of different impact 
distribution to policy makers. By focusing on vertical equity, this issue is brought to the 
attention of both scholars and decision makers. Based on(Harrison and Shepherd 2014) the 
issue of Low Carbon Vehicles (LCVs) uptake and the implications on predefined socio-
economic groups is assessed through an empirical analysis. In this way, the overarching paper 
aim to operationalise different strands of research (Harrison and Shepherd 2014; 
Thomopoulos and Grant-Muller, 2013; van Wee, 2011) and improve the practice of CBA is 
pursued. 
Thus, the contribution of this paper lays in the application of selected ethical theories 
within transport CBA to revisit the issue of impact distribution when promoting low carbon 
policies which is apposite after COP21 held in Paris. This paper starts off with an overview of 
common CBA criticisms, then followed by a brief review of applicable ethical theories. By 
applying these theories in the context of the LCVs uptake in California, section 4 offers 
evidence of the applicability of the suggested approach in different contexts. Hence, it 
contributes in the on-going debate regarding the improvement of CBA in practice. 
 
2.  Transport and ethics literature 
Transport can be both the cause and resolution of societal inequalities. The provision of 
transport for access to goods and services contrasts with potentially negative safety, 
environmental and social impacts, and as such can be subject to ethical debate (Mullen 2012). 
There is a pertinent need at the moment to review and improve transport evaluation practices 
in developed countries amidst recession and budgetary constraints in Europe, the US and 
Japan, alongside the revitalised discussion about climate change globally (UNFCCC, 2015). 
Perhaps ethics and distributional implications have been neglected for a long time by 
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academics and those involved in transport assessment, so recent publications aim at bridging 
this gap (Martens, 2015; Thomopoulos et al, 2009; van Wee, 2011) while addressing 
contemporary needs and the need to incorporate non-quantifiable impacts in the appraisal 
(Mackie and Preston, 1998). A similar research gap has been reported within a related sector, 
namely bioenergy, resulting in a need to reassess overall benefits of environmental policies 
and refocus attention to key issues surrounding such innovative policies including its social 
dimension (Levidow and Papaioannou, 2013). The novelty of such approaches lays in the fact 
that decision making in the transport sector has been dominated by engineers who perceive 
ethics as a sub-discipline of philosophy which is irrelevant to transport  in their minds 
(Bowen, 2012; van Wee, 2011). It is this identified gap which forms the rationale of this 
paper. The complexity and abstraction of ethical theories may have rightly discouraged its 
inclusion in assessment frameworks to date, but theories such as the ones suggested by Rawls 
or Walzer may open new horizons to transport debates. Explaining such theories in more 
detail is out of the scope of this paper, yet both philosophy and ethics have a lot to offer to 
transport policy makers by challenging established practices (Harrison and Shepherd 2014; 
Thomopoulos, 2013; van Wee, 2011). Attempts to operationalise ethical theories are not new 
as discussed in this section. However, attempts to operationalise theories such as Rawls’ in 
such a detailed level have been rare to date. 
On one hand, CBA remains the most commonly used assessment method in Europe 
(Odgaard et al, 2005) and other developed countries (Mackie and Worsley, 2013). On the 
other hand, the established view that welfare maximisation advocated by CBA should be the 
sole indicator used in transport interventions has been challenged, fostering approaches 
incorporating other methods such as Multi-Criteria Analysis (MCA) (Annema et al, 2015; 
Guehnemann et al, 2012; Thomopoulos and Grant-Muller, 2013). Equally, Gardiner (2011) 
challenges utilitarianism which underpins CBA, followed by the severe criticism of “CBA 
paralysis” due to weaknesses of this method owed to the discount rate used and 
intergenerational equity. Others (Beukers et al, 2012; Mouter et al, 2013b; Mouter et al, 2015; 
Pearce et al, 2006; Thomopoulos et al, 2009) have summarised the disadvantages of CBA, 
acknowledging though certain strengths of this method largely based on its appeal to policy 
makers. Nonetheless, acute views about CBA are not a new phenomenon since its critics have 
expressed their views at least since the 1970s (Turner, 1979).  
Applying constructive criticism on CBA through the provision of useful suggestions 
has been a relatively new strand. This paper falls within this realm since it recognises certain 
virtues of CBA, but addresses its weakness regarding the disaggregation of impact 
distribution derived from welfare maximisation. A suitable way of achieving this is by 
introducing equity theories in transport assessment through CBA. In spite of the high number 
of authors who have developed and written about equity theories, only limited cases exist 
where such theories have been applied in the transport sector and fewer about low carbon 
vehicles. 
Martens (2009) for example focuses on Walzer’s spheres of justice (1983) stating that 
transport – conceived as accessibility by him – should have its own distributional sphere of 
justice since it has become a necessity in the 21st century. Remarkably, he argues that neither 
mobility nor accessibility can be distributed based on the principle of equality. This view can 
be justified, but can be also overruled if equality is defined accordingly (e.g. equal annual cost 
of transport either in absolute terms or as an income proportion to use a LCV to commute to 
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work – i.e. not having to own one). Neither Rawls’ (1972) equity principles satisfy the strict 
conditions set out by Martens (2009). Yet, based on Walzer’s spheres theory, it is important 
to identify according to which equity or distributive principle the ‘transport good’ should be 
allocated. This query is explored through the empirical analysis in section 4. 
Nevertheless, the adjusted Rawls principles (1972) operationalised by Khisty (1996) 
including the egalitarian principle, appear to be appropriate for the analysis of this paper, thus 
are explained in section 3 and utilised to derive the results discussed in section 4. Such an 
approach warrants pursuing welfare maximisation both for the society overall and for certain 
social groups, addressing vertical equity concerns. The fact that it is uncommon for decision 
makers to share the same views about the applicable ethical theory1 in each case has obvious 
implications for the appraisal outcome since no common vision is shared. An increased 
interest about Rawls’ theory could initiate new discussions among scholars and decision 
makers which could eventually lead in improving CBA practice.  
 
3.  Methodology 
The methodology applied in this paper is based on a  case study by Walther et al (2010) 
which models the Californian Low Emission Vehicles Regulation to understand manufacturer 
response in an attempt to increase the market share of Zero Emission Vehicles (ZEVs). This 
was extended by Harrison and Shepherd (2014) in an attempt to assess the impact of 
regulatory approaches on LCV purchases within a proposed ethical framework.  Based on 
Harrison and Shepherd (2014) and Thomopoulos and Grant-Muller (2013), further analysis 
has been conducted here to adapt that case study, focusing on vehicle purchase costs instead 
of manufacturers’ market shares to highlight short term distributional impacts and social 
implications of such environmental policies. The analysis in those papers includes both 
demand and supply side policy measures which constitute the backbone of the alternative 
policy scenarios developed. These scenarios are useful both for academics and decision 
makers because they provide the opportunity to test the impacts of alternative policies 
including the Business As Usual (BAU) scenario. Consequently, the focus in this paper is the 
deriving vertical equity implications for social groups observed through a restricted CBA 
conducted from the perspective of a single LCV manufacturer operating in California for just 
over a decade (2009-2020). 
It is worth mentioning here that although it is widely acknowledged (EC, 2013; IPCC, 
2007; Stern, 2006; Rode et al, 2014; Stern, 2013) that LCVs should be adopted – either in the 
short-term or in the long-term – this adoption should not exacerbate inequalities between 
social groups. The European Union has introduced a flexible legislation allowing 
manufacturers to assess their carbon emissions not per individual car but for their whole car 
fleet, set at 130g of CO2/km for 2012-2015 and to 95g CO2/km from 2020 (EC, 2013). One of 
the motivations of this paper has been that although car use overall may decrease in the future 
as a result of environmental policies, certain already vulnerable social groups – who may 
                                                           
1
 For the purposes of this paper, equity theories, equity principles and ethical theories are considered to 
be synonymous as the focus is more on the application of such theories in the transport sector rather 
than in identifying their differences. 
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already be more car-dependent – e.g. unemployed, elderly, disabled, should not be 
disadvantaged during the adjustment period. Rather this adjustment is expected to be 
facilitated through relevant government policies, maintaining or increasing vertical equity. 
Along the same lines, Harrison and Shepherd (2014) have demonstrated that the Regulation 
alternative policy scenario is the one with the highest potential success rate in reducing 
carbon emissions. Yet, this may favour those already most well off and users may bear more 
costs than government or industry, creating a problematic policy decision. Therefore this 
alternative scenario is used as the foundation of the core policy option in this paper.  
Nonetheless, it is essential to present here all the background information and 
assumptions of this analysis to offer a complete overview. The context of this analysis is 
California due to the advanced position of this state regarding the introduction of LCVs and 
the existence of previous analyses in that state. A further reason has been the sharper fall of 
family income in California compared to the rest of the US, particularly for those in the lower 
income quintiles, between 2007 and 2010 (Schiff and Bohn, 2011), which may have an 
adverse impact on household decisions in relation to LCV purchases. Additionally, California 
is the only US state with four major cities with a median family income of less than $30 000 
available for new car purchases (Guillot, 2013). The time horizon (2009-2020) has been 
selected based on data availability. Further information and data about California used in this 
paper are presented in Table 3.1. 
Table: 3.1: Background information and facts about California used in this paper (CalStats, 
2012; CFED, 2011, US Census 2013) 
FACTS 
Population (2010) 37 253 956 
Households (2007-2011) 12 433 172 
Population density per sq.mile (2010) 239.1 
Average Household size (2007-2011) 2.91 
Median Household Income (2007-11)   $61 632 
Personal Income (2009) $41 034 
Registered cars 22 083 049 
CVRA trucks 440 751 
Non-CVRA trucks 5 061 180 
Miscellaneous vehicles 126 705 
Total number of vehicles 27 711 685 
Vehicles per household 2.17 
Five income quintiles (Table 3.2) have been used to create five social groups (Q1-Q5 in 
section 4.1) and review the impact distribution of costs and benefits of the uptake of LCVs in 
California. Each quintile has been designed to include 20% of the population based on CFED 
(2011), therefore social groups include the same number of people but inevitably reflect 
diverse total incomes. Those who belong to the lower income quintile are less likely to own a 
car currently, therefore they are expected to benefit less (if at all) through any policies such as 
LCV purchase subsidies. Transport costs in California reflect the third largest budget share 
for the 25% of the lowest income households, whilst they comprise the second largest budget 
share after housing for all the rest of the households (PPIC, 2004b). Thus it is assumed that 
income can be used as a useful proxy in this paper. 
6 
 
Table 3.2: Income quintiles in California – Authors’ calculations with information from 
CFED (2011) 
 
Having reviewed the social grouping by Khisty (1996) where randomly defined income 
classes have been used, the approach in this paper is using the aforementioned income 
quintiles based on an egalitarian approach for each individual. By estimating the mean 
income for each quintile the total income for each quintile has been derived (Table 3.2). 
Another assumption used in this paper is that each quintile spends different income 
proportions for new vehicles (SBE, 2010) and will continue to spend similar income 
proportions for new LCVs in the future. As shown in Figure 3.1, spending on new vehicles 
increases from 3.1% of income for the lowest income quintile to 8.9% for the highest income 
quintile. Not surprisingly, income spent on used cars purchases decreases for the two highest 
income quintiles, since these users are able to afford new vehicles due to their higher 
earnings. However, these proportions are distinct from the income proportion spent on private 
vehicle expenditures which is 19% for low income quintiles and may reach 35% for very low 
income quintiles, while it averages 16% for all other income quintiles (PPIC, 2004a).  
 
Figure 3.1: Household spending on new and used vehicles as a proportion of Total California-
Taxable Spending by Income Quintile (SBE, 2010) 
California  Quintile 1 (Q1) Quintile 2 (Q2) Quintile 3 (Q3) Quintile 4 (Q4) Quintile 5 (Q5) 
Income Less than $22,606  $22,606 - $44,497  $44,498 - $72,295  $72,296 - $119,103  More than $119,103 
Average p.c. income  $ 11,303   $  33,552   $ 58,397   $ 95,700   $ 150,000  
Population in quintile 7 450 791 7 450 791 7 450 791 7 450 791 7 450 791 
Total income of 
population quintile  $ 84,216,292,933.60   $ 249,985,220,946.80   $ 435,100,128,310.80   $ 713,036,992,444.40   $ 1,117,618,680,000.00  
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After establishing the background and assumptions of this analysis, it is also necessary 
to highlight the links with the contents of CBA. Since CBA revolves around welfare 
maximisation which in turn is intertwined with Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, this paper illustrates 
potential improvements about impact distribution elucidated through a CBA example. Due to 
the objectives of this paper, the focus here is on the distribution of vehicle purchase costs for 
users. Therefore, the User Purchase cost is distributed in each quintile based on alternative 
ethical theories. A range of theories have been selected based on the literature review and the 
prerequisite to be applicable in the current context of transport appraisal. These theories have 
been operationalised to five principles, namely: 
1. equal shares 
2. egalitarian 
3. maximum range between groups 
4. minimum floor of impacts i.e. Rawls  
5. equal proportions 
 
More details about their operationalisation are discussed in sections 4 and 5. 
In this way, this paper bridges the identified gap between Khisty (1996) and the need to 
introduce ethical theories in transport appraisal already discussed by scholars (Martens, 2009; 
Mouter, 2014; Thomopoulos, 2010; van Wee, 2011). Established inequality indicators (Gini, 
Theil, Atkinson) may not always produce similar results which is justified according to Sen 
(1973) due to the fact that each of these indicators is founded on alternative ethical 
judgements implying alternative approaches on the aggregation of information contained in 
the distribution. To complement the discussion about impact distribution with policy relevant 
findings, three policy options as described by Harrison and Shepherd (2014) are reviewed 
(section 4.1):  
i) Subsidy  
ii) Regulation  
iii) Both policies 
 
to explore diverse impacts and minimise the intensification of vertical equity implications. 
These are contrasted with the Business As Usual scenario. 
 
4. Results and discussion 
Based on the methodology described in the previous section, the results about LCVs are 
presented here followed by a discussion of the deriving issues and the implications for 
improving the contents of CBA.  
4.1 Results 
Benefits in this analysis include reduced emissions (in MtGHG) which vary depending 
on the uptake and use of LCVs. Studies in Italy for example (Calabrese, 2015) have 
highlighted the potential benefits through government subsidies for the automotive industry. 
However, those studies have not focused on distributional impacts and have excluded analysis 
about specific user groups.  Analysis by others though (Figure 4.1) has demonstrated two 
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interesting findings related to this study. Crist (2012) has discussed how the introduction of 
Government subsidies may significantly reduce the positive impacts of BEVs (used as a 
proxy of LCV in that case), which generates demand for a fruitful discussion about the cost 
and benefits of such policies. In addition, he points out the potential benefits for either a 
single manufacturer or a national sector focusing on BEVs manufacturing due to the 
anticipated benefits based on exports and international trade. The latter option is already 
being explored in France, which means that analyses similar to the one presented in this paper 
are contemporary and of high policy relevance. 
 
Figure 4.1: Lifetime fiscal and social revenues for a B class French ICE and BEV (€ 
per vehicle) – Source: Crist (2012) 
 The system dynamics model described by Harrison and Shepherd (2014) has been used 
to simulate the overall costs and benefits of different policies. Due to the aim of this paper 
and the findings of Crist (2012), we have focused on three alternative policy options, namely 
one which included only subsidies for LCVs, one which included only regulation for LCVs 
and one which included a combination of these two policies. Table 4.1 shows the costs of 
these policies as well as the emissions reduction impact which is the overall benefit in this 
analysis. Since the purpose of this paper has been to illustrate the method through this 
empirical analysis, we have solely focused on costs. This is sensible since it has been assumed 
that all users are affected the same by GHGs.  
Table 4.1: Discounted costs ($bn) of the three selected policies compared to baseline 
(Harrison and Shepherd, 2014) 
Government 
Costs 
User Purchase 
Costs 
User Running 
Costs 
Industry 
Costs 
Overall 
Costs 
Emissions reduction 
(Mt GHG) 
Subsidy 1.18 -0.95 -0.18 0.13 0.18 0.97 
Regulation 0.00 50.66 -28.58 -1.05 21.03 134.95 
Both policies 1.35 49.38 -28.68 -0.93 21.11 135.57 
 
The overall costs column demonstrates the total cost of each policy which is the main 
value to be included in the CBA. This is then disaggregated to the key categories – similarly 
to the Benefit Impact Table (Nakamura, 2000) – which contain the Government imposing the 
regulations and providing the subsidies, the Industry which includes a single manufacturer in 
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this model – following Crist (2012) – and the Users purchasing vehicles who face two types 
of costs i.e. purchase and running ones. Since there is a single manufacturer in this model for 
California (LCVs manufacturing is assumed to be a competitive market internationally) and 
the analysis focuses on a single market (regulated by one Government), it is fair to assume 
that impact distribution matters more for individuals purchasing cars rather than for the two 
other categories of stakeholders i.e. the Government and the single manufacturer. Therefore 
the remaining tables focus on impact distribution of user purchase costs among the five 
income quintiles in California which is the spatial region we focused our analysis on.  
When the Government introduces subsidies to support the introduction of LCVs, this 
results in reduced purchase cost for users. Consequently, this policy has a user benefit 
($0.95bn) in this analysis (the Government bears a cost of $1.18bn – Table 4.1).  Ιn reality 
though this benefit will most likely benefit more the upper income quintiles as they will be 
the ones purchasing the more expensive LCVs and thus receiving the larger benefit in 
absolute terms. Table 4.2 demonstrates the impacts for all users in each quintile initially and 
then for each individual user of each quintile. Five equity theories have been employed to 
operationalise the implications for each income group. 
Table 4.2: Benefits distribution ($0.95bn) of user purchase costs among the five income 
quintile groups based on selected equity theories. Total benefit ($) for all users in the quintile, 
per capita benefit for all users in quintile. Q1 has the lowest income, whereas Q5 has the 
highest income. 
 
Aggregate distribution 
SUBSIDY Equal shares Egalitarian 
Maximum range of B 
between quintiles 
(e.g. $100mil) 
Maximum ceiling / 
Rawls (e.g. $300mil) Equal proportions 
Q1 
 $ 189,601,913   $ 407,572,024   $  250,000,000   $ 300,000,000   $ 13,314,596  
Q2 
 $ 189,601,913   $ 260,160,119   $ 200,000,000   $ 250,000,000   $ 61,196,382  
Q3 
 $ 189,601,913   $ 158,723,214   $ 180,000,000   $ 200,000,000   $ 126,483,607  
Q4 
 $ 189,601,913   $ 90,855,357   $ 170,000,000   $ 150,000,000   $ 240,008,252  
Q5 
 $ 189,601,913   $ 30,650,000   $ 150,000,000   $ 48,000,000   $ 507,287,119  
 
Per capita distribution 
SUBSIDY Equal shares Egalitarian 
Maximum range of B 
between quintiles 
(e.g. $100mil) 
Maximum ceiling / 
Rawls (e.g. $300mil) Equal proportions 
Q1 p.c. $ 25 $ 55 $ 34 $ 40 $ 2 
Q2 p.c. $ 25 $ 35 $  27 $ 34 $ 8 
Q3 p.c. $ 25 $ 21 $  24 $ 27 $ 17 
Q4 p.c. $ 25 $ 12 $  23 $ 20 $ 32 
Q5 p.c. $ 25 $  4 $  20 $  6 $ 68 
 
According to the equal shares theory, all income groups share the subsidy policy 
benefits equally ($189 601 913). The egalitarian approach advocates that the end situation 
should bring all users to a more equal situation, therefore lower incomes benefit by higher 
subsidies to allow them to purchase LCVs and/or purchase larger LCVs depending on their 
household situation. Based on the maximum range of benefits approach, the income quintile 
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receiving the highest benefits should not receive an absolute benefit over a predefined 
threshold (e.g. $100mil). Similarly, utilising Rawlsian theory, a maximum ceiling may be 
predefined not allowing any given income quintile to receive more benefits than this 
predefined threshold (e.g. $300mil). With such an approach it is safeguarded that 
disadvantaged groups will improve their absolute situation, while advantaged ones will 
maintain their relatively advantageous position. On the other hand, the equal proportions 
approach is based on the distribution of benefits based on the income proportion spent by 
each quintile to purchase new cars (SBE, 2010). The fact that higher income individuals will 
receive more subsidies may appear as a paradox, but this will be discussed in the next section. 
Moving on to the second policy, Table 4.3 shows the impact distribution according to 
the Regulation policy. Naturally, this policy has no financial cost for the Government, 
whereas it introduces considerable costs for users intensified by the fact that manufacturers 
are able to pass regulation costs to end users (Table 4.1). Therefore, costs are considerably 
higher compared to the benefits in the previous policy option and reach $27bn for the highest 
income quintile (Q5) in the Equal proportions approach (Table 4.3). A progressive cost 
distribution has been applied based on the Egalitarian theory, where the lowest income 
quintile (Q1) will have to contribute $1.5bn, whilst Q5 will have to contribute almost $22bn. 
A $5bn maximum range threshold has been set for the respective principle, whilst a minimum 
range of $1.2bn has been set for the Rawlsian approach based on an almost 50% contribution 
of the average car purchase expenses of the lowest income group. It is noteworthy that the 
equal proportions approach results in a lower contribution by the lowest income groups in this 
policy option compared with the Subsidy option where benefits were distributed instead of 
costs. 
Table 4.3: Cost distribution ($50.66bn) of user purchase costs among the five income 
quintile groups based on selected equity theories. Total cost ($) for all users in the quintile, 
per capita benefit for all users in quintile. Q1 has the lowest income, whereas Q5 has the 
highest income.  
Aggregate distribution 
REGULATION Equal shares Egalitarian 
Maximum range of 
C between quintiles 
(e.g. $5bn) 
Minimum floor / 
Rawls ($1.2bn) 
Equal 
proportions 
Q1 
 $ 10,132,117,830   $  1,586,000,000   $  8,000,000,000   $ 1,227,031,388   $ 711,417,135  
Q2 
 $ 10,132,117,830   $  4,861,428,571   $ 9,000,000,000   $ 5,519,673,679   $ 3,269,806,690  
Q3 
 $ 10,132,117,830   $  8,492,857,143   $ 10,000,000,000   $ 9,920,282,925   $ 6,758,192,743  
Q4 
 $ 10,132,117,830   $ 13,920,476,190   $ 11,000,000,000   $ 14,118,132,450   $ 12,823,970,309  
Q5 
 $ 10,132,117,830   $ 21,808,095,238   $ 13,000,000,000   $ 19,893,612,504   $ 27,105,047,037  
 
Per capita distribution 
REGULATION Equal shares Egalitarian 
Maximum range of 
C between quintiles 
(e.g. $5bn) 
Minimum floor / 
Rawls ($1.2bn) 
Equal 
proportions 
Q1 p.c. 
 $ 1,360   $ 213   $ 1,074   $ 165   $ 95  
Q2 p.c. 
 $ 1,360   $ 652   $ 1,208   $ 741   $ 439  
Q3 p.c. 
 $ 1,360   $ 1,140   $ 1,342   $ 1,331   $ 907  
Q4 p.c. 
 $ 1,360   $ 1,868   $ 1,476   $ 1,895   $ 1,721  
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Yet, the third and most plausible policy option is based on a combination of both 
policies. As explained in section 3, an equal contribution of the Subsidy and Regulation 
approaches has been incorporated in the model used for this analysis and the results are 
shown in Table 4.4. The results are equivalent to the Regulation policy reflecting the slightly 
lower cost due to the positive impact of the inclusion of the Subsidy policy. 
Table 4.4: Cost distribution ($49.38bn) of user purchase costs among the five income 
quintile groups based on selected equity theories. Total cost ($) for all users in the quintile, 
per capita benefit for all users in quintile. Q1 has the lowest income, whereas Q5 has the 
highest income.  
Aggregate distribution 
BOTH 
POLICIES Equal shares Egalitarian 
Maximum range of 
C between quintiles 
(e.g. $5bn) 
Minimum floor / 
Rawls ($1bn) 
Equal 
proportions 
Q1 
 $ 9,875,267,968   $ 1,596,378,920   $ 7,000,000,000   $ 1,000,000,000   $ 693,272,734  
Q2 
 $ 9,875,267,968   $ 4,732,123,228   $ 9,000,000,000   $ 4,445,000,000   $ 3,186,411,620  
Q3 
 $ 9,875,267,968   $ 8,266,962,265   $ 10,000,000,000   $ 9,920,282,925   $ 6,585,827,827  
Q4 
 $ 9,875,267,968   $ 13,550,216,310   $ 11,000,000,000   $ 14,118,132,450   $ 12,496,900,241  
Q5 
 $ 9,875,267,968   $ 21,228,038,736   $ 12,000,000,000   $ 19,893,612,504   $ 26,413,744,002  
 
Per capita distribution 
BOTH 
POLICIES Equal shares Egalitarian 
Maximum range of 
C between quintiles 
(e.g. $5bn) 
Minimum floor / 
Rawls ($1bn) 
Equal 
proportions 
Q1 p.c. 
 $ 1,325.40   $ 214.26   $ 939.50   $ 134.21   $ 93.05  
Q2 p.c. 
 $ 1,325.40   $ 635.12   $ 1,207.93   $ 596.58   $ 427.66  
Q3 p.c. 
 $ 1,325.40   $ 1,109.54   $ 1,342.14   $ 1,331.44   $ 883.91  
Q4 p.c. 
 $ 1,325.40   $ 1,818.63   $ 1,476.35   $ 1,894.85   $ 1,677.26  
Q5 p.c. 
 $ 1,325.40   $ 2,849.10   $ 1,610.57   $ 2,670.00   $ 3,545.09  
 
 
Q5 p.c. 
 $ 1,360   $ 2,927   $ 1,745   $ 2,670   $ 3,638  
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Figure 4.2: Overview of each income quintile contribution based on the five equity theories. 
An overview of the total contribution of each income quintile according to the five selected 
equity theories is presented in Figure 4.2. As anticipated the quintiles with the higher income 
(Q4 and Q5) contribute more than the quintiles with the lower income (Q1-Q3), particularly 
when the egalitarian, Rawlsian and equal proportions theories are applied (Figure 4.2). In 
addition to the results presented through Tables 4.1-4.4, some further findings come out of the 
analysis of the System Dynamics model. Vehicle size (XS, S, M, L) appears to play a key role 
as anticipated and this is discussed in the subsequent section. This is proven since the 
introduction of very small (XS) LCVs results in decreased demand for all other car sizes 
(Walther et al. 2010). Remarkably though, findings suggest that purchase costs of large (L) 
vehicles – cICEV – have increased at a lower rate compared to small (S) vehicles, 28% to 
13% respectively (Harrison and Shepherd 2014). The latter highlights the existence of certain 
fixed costs for the manufacturing of any size of LCVs which raises vertical equity concerns. 
Moreover, the introduction of penalties about emission reduction and LCV technologies 
appear to be the most effective policy measures which could avoid the transfer of costs from 
manufacturers to those purchasing cars. 
 
4.2 Discussion 
A series of issues have arisen through the empirical analysis of the LCVs uptake in 
California. First we discuss here some issues based on the findings and then some wider 
methodological issues relevant to the wider aims of this paper.  
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As argued by Harrison and Shepherd (2014), vehicle size may be used as an income 
proxy for such a disaggregation, using the four vehicle sizes (XS, S, M, L) as defined by 
Walther et al (2010). If such a proxy is used, it can be assumed that lower income households 
purchase smaller sized vehicles whereas higher income households purchase larger vehicles. 
This may correspond for California but would need to be reviewed for other developed areas 
e.g. Europe where those in higher income quintiles sometimes purchase small cars. Generally 
speaking though, lower income households have limited (if any) income proportion to spend 
on purchasing a car. Table 4.5 reviews the cost increase impacts between 2009 and 2020 for 
each vehicle size. If this proxy is used, then these vehicle purchase cost increases can be 
linked with the income quintiles and the impact distribution analysis which preceded in 
section 4.1. Although the price differentials remain fairly constant, the simulation of different 
policy scenarios has allowed the identification of uneven cost burdens for those purchasing 
small vehicles (S) when ICE vehicles are gradually forced out of the market to reduce the 
overall GHGs impact. This may have an adverse effect for those on lower incomes (e.g. Q1 or 
Q2 in section 4.1) which could be acknowledged in the decision making process when 
reviewing policy options, since the increase of 28% is more than double the increase for large 
vehicles. 
Table 4.5: Average LCV purchase cost for various car sizes. XS: extra small, S: small, M: 
medium, L: large (Harrison and Shepherd, 2014) 
 
Start year Fixed Baseline Both policies % increase for  
Car size 2009 2020 2020  
XS n/a 13 432 15 048  
S 12 799 16 172 20 698 28% 
M 17 749 21 683 2 ,340 15% 
L 27 649 30 365 34 413 13% 
 
Although Table 4.5 shows some interesting findings, it would have been useful to have 
accurate facts about the mix of vehicle size for each income quintile (or other social grouping) 
to avoid errors in planning assumptions as well as in the definition of the BAU scenario and 
the do minimum scenario. The latter could act as a major improvement in the accuracy of 
such analyses as Mackie and Preston (1998) have pointed out and could be the focus of future 
research. Furthermore, the introduction of policies such as the promotion of LCVs impact 
disproportionately certain groups of users who often do not have reasonable alternatives. For 
example, those who have no access at home charging facilities - for electric vehicles - or have 
high travel commitments will be disadvantaged. Imposing regulatory penalties would achieve 
the greatest GHG emission reductions, but would also increase purchase costs and change 
market shares, impacting disproportionately certain social groups due to diverse income 
levels and car use reliance. When considering those who are most vulnerable to purchase cost 
changes, non-car owners may have little reliance on cars at this point in time, but their 
opportunity of purchasing a car (if needed) in the future is further prevented by the increased 
costs, deteriorating their position relatively. Similar impacts may occur for the less affluent 
social groups and those who may already own an ICE car.  
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This point brings up one of the core arguments of this paper which is the 
operationalisation of selected ethical theories to improve the contents of CBA. These are 
presented in a neutral way and without the authors’ intention of arguing in favour of any 
specific approach. Moreover, the objective is to highlight the advantage of carrying out a 
pluralist assessment.  Five different approaches have been operationalised and presented in 
section 4.1, so here we review particular points to generate discussion and provide some 
practical suggestions. In the definition of the maximum range (or ceiling) for example, there 
is an inherent issue of subjectivity since this can be an arbitrary decision. Yet in practice this 
can either be linked with an absolute sum based on a predefined amount which higher income 
quintiles can be asked to contribute or linked with the proportional difference between the 
average income between the lowest and highest income quintiles. 
On the other hand, consistent use of such approaches may also create paradoxes as was 
the case in the equal proportions approach where higher incomes received more benefits 
(Table 4.2). Inversely, if there are net costs (the reduction of GHGs is one such case, although 
it is acknowledged that most CBAs of funded projects have net benefits) lower income 
quintiles bear lower costs. Reviewing the rest of the ethical principles operationalised in 
section 4.1, the equal shares is probably the easiest to implement since all costs or benefits are 
distributed equally among the social groups. For the egalitarian principle, two factors have 
been considered in this paper: i) the average income of each quintile spent on new car 
purchases ii) the proportional relationship between the lowest income quintile group (which 
has been used as the basis) with the other quintile income groups. 
A different point which needs to be stressed though is that in the future state revenues 
may decrease due to lower fuel tax revenues (Shepherd et al. 2012) as experienced in 2015 
due to lower oil prices globally, but they may also increase through the need to renew car 
fleets more often due to LCVs’ maintenance issues which have implications for user running 
costs. Therefore, further analysis of interactions and dynamics is required specifically for 
Government impacts of LCV policies. The use of System Dynamics as suggested in this paper 
may facilitate such analyses further.  
5. Conclusions and future research 
Overall, it can be said that despite the inherent difficulties and inevitable subjectivity 
when attempting to operationalise ethical theories in transport appraisal, this can be achieved 
with promising results as demonstrated. As Aldred (2012) put it: “if a large cut in emissions 
is to be made by society overall, everyone should ‘do their bit’ by making a particular kind of 
sacrifice rather than paying others to do it instead”. Thus, having applied selected ethical 
theories in the appraisal of policies for the uptake of LCVs in California, this paper has 
illustrated the potential improvements into CBA practice which can increase the decision 
makers’ overview of impact distribution (Figure 4.2) while continuing to benefit by the merits 
of CBA. Findings should be reviewed along with the urge to utilise multiple methods forming 
an integrated appraisal framework which incorporates CBA, modelling and ethical 
components since those can work in parallel and complement each other. It appears that 
System Dynamics modelling represents a promising approach for addressing deeply uncertain 
dynamically complex societal challenges (Kwakkel and Pruyt, 2013). In summary, findings of 
this paper build up on previous findings (Harrison 2013; Thomopoulos et al, 2009) and 
suggest that the stages to follow should be: 
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• to identify relevant ethical issues 
• to agree on the ethical theory to be used  
• to develop a model addressing these issues 
• to formulate mitigation policies acknowledging that the model should not be used in 
isolation but in combination with other methods such as CBA 
Such an approach can lead to more informed decision making, noting though that any method 
should not be used as a crystal ball replacing policy makers. The latter corresponds with the 
findings of Mouter et al (2013a) where the role of CBA in The Netherlands has been 
reviewed to conclude that CBA has a crucial role to play in policy making, yet it cannot 
substitute policy makers. Common practice and guidelines exist for selected developed 
countries (Mackie and Worsley, 2013), nevertheless these guidelines may provide best 
practice examples whilst accommodating the needs of developing countries (Dimitriou and 
Gakenheimer, 2011) by allowing customisation of the appraisal to their respective context 
since there may have to be diversions based on different market prices, discount rates or time 
horizons. These findings are of particular interest for automotive manufacturers and policy 
makers following the COP21 agreement in Paris (UNFCCC, 2015). 
Overall, many may argue that policy makers will not find it easy to accommodate 
multiple concerns including ethical ones in their decisions (Wolff, 2011). It becomes 
nonetheless evident through such analyses that the ethical element will gain increased 
importance in future environmental policy making as well as in academic debates supporting 
decision making and evaluation (Ersdal and Aven, 2008; Stern, 2013). 
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